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Abstract: 
This paper attempts to explain how institutions in the reform era of China have evolved by 
looking into the FDI policies and regulations. As history matters, we don’t look solely into the 
previous direct stage to the reform era, and rather look into a longer history starting from prior to 
the 14th century.  The study shows that a dimension of time is crucial to understand institutional 
change in China. Though the initiation of the open-door policy in the reform era is commonly 
regarded as path-break event, we claim that this institutional change is a path dependent event 
from a longer historical view. The path takes a zigzag that is shaped by interaction among 
interested parties: the central government, local governments and economic agents (foreign 
investors in terms of the open-door policies). The historical study shows that mutual needs and 
their behaviours influence their attitudes which further influence institutional building. This also 
further implies how Chinese institutions may evolve in the future and what we should concern 
more about institutional changes in transitional economies. 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of the research project “MNCs’ strategies: authority sharing by co-evolution” in the research 
program “Shifts in governance: local states and private networks in China” sponsored by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). 
 2
  
1. Introduction  
China is a success story of economic reform2. From 1978 to 2003, the average annual growth rate 
of China’s real GDP reached 9.4%, outperforming away other socialist countries in transition. 
This development was accompanied by China’s integrating into the global market. Its overall 
share in world trade has increased from less than 1 percent in 1979 to about 6 percent in 20033, 
which demonstrates that China has become an important actor in the international economy. This 
achievement can be ascribed to two hands: the liberalization of the economic systems and FDI. It 
is claimed that foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important part in driving China’s 
economic transformation over the last 20 years4, by adding to capital formation, stimulating 
upgrading of total factor productivity, creating positive spillover effects to domestic enterprises, 
as well as creating employment opportunities5. The precondition of these contributions is the 
inflow of FDI to China. China is now the largest recipient of FDI in the world. It is interesting 
enough to investigate how China, previously rejecting FDI due to ideological collision, has 
opened its door to FDI which consequently contributes to China’s economic development and 
transformation.  
Some studies show that the Chinese leadership learned to enforce the open-door policies, 
breaking from the direct past. They mainly drew clues from evidence in the period of 1949 to 
1978. Though China was to a large degree isolated itself from outside of the world, some foreign 
investment (e.g. from overseas Chinese or in a way of import substitution) did exist on a 
experimental base. The leadership learnt from these experiments that foreign investment could be 
harmless under the proper control. Ideologically, China made a path break in 1978 when the 
economic reform and open-door policy was initiated. This change is historically of significance, 
                                                 
2 Typically, the success of China’s economic reform is compared with the relatively unsuccessful reform of Russia, 
as manifested by Peter Nolan in his 1995 book title “China Rise, Russia Fall”. This comparison is often made by 
outcomes in terms of annual growth rate of GDP. This comparison is extremely revealing before the mid 1990s. In 
the period of 1990 and 1996, China was growing at an average rate of 10% annually, while Russia was decreasing at 
an average rate of 7% annually (WDI 2004).  
3 Prasad (2004), “China’s Growth and Integration into the World Economy: Prospects and Challenges”, p.1. 
4 EIU (2003), Country Profile: China; World Bank (1997b) also claims that FDI has been a main driving force 
behind in China’s economic success 
5 Tseng and Zebregs (2002) have addressed this issue. They further draw on it the implications for other countries.  
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not only to China and all Chinese people, but also to the world and foreign investors. To 
understand this striking initiation and the following changes and achievement, it is not enough to 
trace back to the previous socialist past in China. Instead, given China’s history, a long historical 
perspective is needed, looking into China’s historical attitudes towards foreign participation, 
which will help us to understand this change much better and richer. Historically, China has 
experienced different phases in which they treated foreign investment differently, from 
indifferent to reluctant to hostile and to positive. The historical attitudes show that the 
institutional change since 1978 is a path break from the previous stage, but not necessarily a 
break from a long historical perspective. We argue that path dependence or path break has a time 
dimension in which institutional path shapes a zigzag, which is highly influenced by attitudes of 
interested parties involved.    
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of FDI development in China and 
conventional explanations; Section 3 looks into historical attitudes of China towards foreign 
investment and their influence on policies; Section 4 searches for sources of institutional path in 
the reform era in terms of FDI-related institutional changes; Section 5 concludes the paper with 
implication of understanding path dependence in China’s economic reform and suggestions for 
further study.  
2. Explanations for FDI development  
World Bank claims that FDI is a major driving force behind the economic success in China. In 
1990s, China has absorbed about half of the FDI inflows into all developing countries. This is a 
remarkable achievement, considering that (1) China is a socialist country with institutions that 
differ from those in developed countries; and (2) there are still many complains about the 
investment climates.  
Due to historical and ideological reasons, explained below, FDI was very limited in China before 
the economic reform. However, the reform policy, together with the open-door orientation, has 
changed this significantly. This change takes a gradual process. At the beginning, FDI was 
attracted as “experimental” reform and confined to certain regions. Gradually, the regulation on 
FDI has been liberalized, and consequently FDI has been rapidly increased and spread over all 
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regions. By the end of 2003, 465,277 foreign invested enterprises have been approved to 
establish, and cumulative contracted FDI value has reached to US $943.13 billion, of which US 
$501.47 billion has been realized6. Figure 1 shows the development trend of FDI in China. In the 
year of 2003, the total realized FDI inflow reached US $53.5 billion, which is about 30 times the 
amount in the years of 1979-1982, and 12 times that in the year of 1991. Comparatively, the FDI 
inflow has been faster in 1990s than in 1980s.  
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Figure 1 Trend of Realized FDI in China 
 
There are different interpretations for China’s success, especially in attracting FDI inflows. One 
typical interpretation is that China is a large domestic marketplace with a large pool of cheap 
labour and a rapid growing market. Second, complementary to the above, studies show that 
increased inflow of FDI is a response to the improving investment climates, especially the 
improving FDI regimes and legal framework7. Third, yet, there is also a contrasting interpretation 
that increased inflow of FDI may be results of institutional deficits of the Chinese economy8. 
These institutional deficits, nevertheless they may also have negative effects on FDI’s 
                                                 
6 Data source is China MOC. 
7 Lardy (1994) and Fu (2000). 
8 This is argued by Huang (2001). Put it particular, the economic fragmentation in China’s economy weakens the 
bargaining power of China as a whole, and further leads to more than enough favourable conditions for FDI due to 
locational competition.  
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contribution to the economy especially when these effects are studied at sub-national level9 and 
industry level10, led to increasing of FDI inflows due to locational competition. These 
explanations need to be further clarified.   
2.1. Global Trend 
The FDI growth in China is not a single case. It is accompanied with or highly influenced by the 
global trend of FDI development. Figure 2 demonstrates the development of world trade. In the 
years before 1997, the FDI development in China followed a same trend as that of the world 
mode and that of other economies. In the years between 1997 and 1999, the FDI development in 
China followed a same declining trend as that of developing economies, while the global FDI 
inflows and those into developed economies were increasing. Since the year of 2000, the FDI 
development follows a complete different pattern. While the world FDI flows and inflows to 
other economies have been experiencing a decrease, FDI inflows to China have been growing at 
a rapid rate. 
 
Figure 2  Index of FDI inflows by host region 1991-200211 (Data source: UNCTAD 2003) 
                                                 
9 Braunstein and Epstein (2002) demonstrate that “inward FDI has a relatively small positive impact on wages and 
employment, while having a negative impact on domestic investment and tax revenue” at the provincial level. 
(emphasis added). 
10 In auto industry, it has been widely criticized that FDI didn’t lead to more innovation as expected. By recognizing 
the weakness of the Industry Policy in Auto Sector promulgated in 1994, it was revised in 2004 in order to better 
capture the spillover effects.  
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Though the FDI inflows to China are to a certain degree a reflection of the world trend of FDI, 
the trend in China, especially the high steady growth, can’t be explained simply by the world 
trend. More explanations are needed to answer why FDIs or high proportion of world FDIs flow 
into China.  
2.2. Economic determinants 
Many empirical studies have been oriented to features of China that attract to foreign investors. 
These studies are categorized into two groups: studies at the national level and those at the 
regional level12. Most of these studies are focused on economic determinants, mainly including 
market size, foreign trade, endowments of labour and infrastructure.  
Market size is often measured by GDP or GDP per capita. Rapid economic growth may create 
large local markets and business opportunities for foreign investors and hence foster their 
confidence in investing in China or in a region in China. This positive relationship between 
market size and FDI inflows has been confirmed by empirical studies13. These studies also 
investigate the mutual causality between market size and FDI inflows14. The GDP development 
in China is demonstrated in Figure 3. By comparing Figure 1 and Figure 3, it can be seen that 
FDI inflows to China do follow the similar macroeconomic cycles15, which proves the causal 
relationship between these two factors.  
                                                                                                                                                              
11 The calculation of index is on the base of the average annual volume in 1991-1996 at which point the index is 
equal to 1.  
12 Wei (2003). Studies at the national level answer to the question why foreign investors come to China, and 
differently, those at the regional level answer to the question why a foreign investor chooses a specific region in 
China. They tackle some same determinants, i.e. market size, human capital and labour costs, while with some 
additional factors respectively. Studies at the national level also investigate factors like exchange rate, geographic 
proximity, cultural and linguistic ties, and regulatory burden. Differently, studies at the regional level have also 
considered factors such as agglomeration effects, infrastructure and investment incentives. 
13 Zhang (2000) confirms this by studying US and Hongkong investment in China. Wei, et al (1999) and Wei & Liu 
(2001) confirm this relationship at the regional level.  
14 E.g. Zhang (1999). 
15 Oppers (1997) analyzes the macroeconomic cycles of China in the period of 1979-1997. In this paper, we further 
extend the analysis to 2003, while adjusting a little the connection point between cycles.  
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Figure 3 GDP Curve in China 1978-2003 
In addition, low labour costs and relatively large export volume also have significant effects on 
FDI inflows to China16. Not only labour cost, but also labour quality (or human capital) plays an 
important role in attracting FDI. High quality of labour (or skilled labour) is a significant 
determinant of FDI irrespective of its country of origin17. This implies that China’s advantage 
over other developing economies in attracting FDI is not cheap labour alone, but the combination 
of cheap labour and skilled labour. Finally, sound infrastructure and agglomeration have also a 
positive relationship with FDI inflows18. This suggests that once a region has attracted a critical 
mass of FDI, it will be easier for it to attract more as foreign investors perceive the presence of 
other foreign investors as a positive signal19. China’s infrastructure has been rapidly improved. 
For example, the telephone density at the dawn of the reform was only 0.2 per 100 people in 
1979, which has been significantly improved (see in Figure 4). By the end of 2003, the fixed 
telephone density was 21.2 per 100 people; and the mobile telephone density was 20.9 per 100 
people20.  
                                                 
16 Liu, et al (1997) and Wei and Liu (2001). 
17 Wei (2003) and Zhao & Zhu (2000). 
18 Zhao & Zhu (2000).  
19 Tseng and Zebregs (2002), and Cheng and Kwan (2000). 
20 China MII. 
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2.3. Societal determinants 
Studies show that culture may also be a determinant of FDI inflows. Put it particular, FDI may 
prefer to enter into countries where foreign investors experience less cultural difference21. This 
explains why Asian investors, especially those from Hongkong, are dominant in China’s 
marketplace22. In a location with cultural similarity, investors feel more familiar and comfortable 
with business routines and hence perceive low investment risk.  
Besides, the societal development of China also has a positive impact on FDI inflows. 
Particularly relevant is the educational level of the country, which has broad impact on many 
issues of economic development, such as better quality of labour, better understanding of new 
things and more open to new things. In a sense, this aspect is closely related to human capital 
issue that is an economic determinant23. The educational level of a country can be measured 
directly by adult literacy rate. Urbanization can also be variable for the societal development of a 
country, which indicates the degree to which a country is industrialized. This indicator is also 
related to economic development. It can be argued that higher urbanization may indicate higher 
industrialization, which makes a location more attractive to foreign investors. Figure 4 
demonstrate that adult literacy rate and urban population are steadily increasing, which, in a 
sense, reflects that these indicators may be societal determinants of FDI inflows though further 
investigation is needed.  
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21 Wei and Liu (2001). 
22 Khan (2001), Kelley and Luo (1999) 
23 Wei (1995) uses adult literacy rates as a crude measure of average human capital.  
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Figure 4 Infrastructure and Societal Development (Data source: WDI 2004) 
2.4. Institutional determinants 
Besides, studies show that corruption and regulatory burden have a negative impact on FDI 
inflows24. These two indicators have deterred foreign investment from North America and EU25. 
Nevertheless, the rapid growth of FDI inflows to China needs other political explanation. More 
likely, the liberalization of FDI regimes and creation of new institutions are significant 
determinants of FDI in China26. These institutional changes have significantly influenced MNCs’ 
decisions and hence FDI inflows27. At the turn points of the development curve of FDI, there are 
always institutional breaks or important events accompanying with (see in Figure 5 by comparing 
with Figure 1), which highly influenced the inflows of FDI, either increasing foreign investors’ 
confidence or weakening their confidence in investing in China. Furthermore, the FDI regimes 
have been gradually more and more liberalized and reform scope has been extended.  
 
Figure 5 Development phases and institutions 
At the beginning of the reform era, only joint ventures were officially accepted as means of 
investment, according to the Equity Joint Venture Law. In 1986, the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises (WFOE) Law set up the legitimacy of WFOE, which extends options of foreign 
investors in terms of investment modes. In 2004, a revised Investment Regimes of China has 
been published, which offers more autonomy for foreign investors. In addition, China’s FDI 
policy has also a geographic dimension. This scope has been enlarged over time. In 1980, four 
                                                 
24 Wei (2000). Khan (2001) also states that bureaucratic red tape, which is often related to corruption and regulatory 
burden, is one of the chief problems in the operation of FDI.  
25 Zseng and Zebregs (2002). Betra, et al (2003) demonstrate that China is ranked low in terms of bureaucratic 
efficiency, regulatory burden, corruption, and so on, which form part of the investment climate. 
26 Khan (2001), Tseng and Zebregs (2002), Roehrig (1994), Shirk (1994), Fu (2000), and Brown (1986). 
27 Luo (2002) 
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Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Due to 
both internal and external pressures, another 14 coastal cities and the Hainan Island were open to 
foreign investors in 1984. In the following year, another three regions, the Yangze River Delta, 
Pearl River Delta and the Min River Region, were open again. Foreign invested enterprises 
operating in these regions often obtain preferable treatment (such as tax holidays). These 
institutions, together with the market size of China, undoubtedly attract foreign investors to 
establish their businesses (in a specific region) in China. Following the promise of entering into 
WTO, China will open more fields for foreign investment on schedule, which can further foster 
the growth of FDI in China.  
2.5. Summary 
Empirical studies on China demonstrate that the above determinants all have impacts on FDI 
inflows into China. However, it should be noted that institutional determinants are more 
fundamental. It is the economic reform and opening-up policies that lift the ban on FDI and lead 
to rapid growth of FDI inflows by liberalizing investment regimes, accelerating economic 
development and foreign trade28. First, political and legal determinants are subjective, while 
economic and societal determinants are all objective, which is then subjected to attitudes and 
implementation of the host country. Second, these policies create opportunities for foreign 
investors to enter. Third, these policies define the scope of foreign investment and shape their 
behaviours in China. Therefore, it is of significance to investigate how these policies are 
developed and implemented in order to understand the amazing growth of FDIs in China. In 
section 4, we further discuss the institutional changes in more detail.  
3. Historical attitudes of China 
As it is described earlier, the development of FDI is accompanied by the creation and evolution 
of institutions, in terms of laws, rules and regulations, which form China’s FDI regulatory 
framework. The FDI inflows into China and its China’s acceptability need to be explained at the 
level of institutions. These institutional changes are results of changes of perception and attitudes 
from both sides. These institutions reflect changes of the Chinese attitudes towards FDI, while 
the FDI inflows reflect changes of the Western attitudes towards investing in China. Therefore, it 
                                                 
28 Fu (2000). 
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is helpful to look into the development of the economic relationship of China with the West and 
their attitudes towards each other, in order to search for the source of the change. Broadly, the 
historical development of this relationship can be divided into six phases29: the first phase 
(ancient China up to 1368 A.D.); the second phase (1368 – 1842); the third phase (1842 – 1911); 
the fourth phase (1912 – 1949); the fifth phase (1949 – 1978); and the sixth phase (1978 
onwards).  
3.1. The First Phase: Ancient China to 14th century 
In this phase, China’s economic trade with western countries was operated on a sporadic base30 at 
very beginning and became much more extensive later on. During this historical period, China 
was predominant in the world economy31. The Chinese attitude at the central level was a feeling 
of superiority over minor or foreign “barbarians” due to its technological advance32. As a 
consequence, China was officially indifferent to the benefits derived from economic relations 
with those “barbarians”. However, China was just like “a strong magnet for trade”33. This implies 
that foreigners were enthusiastic about trading with China. “Silk road” was established in this 
period by which trade was vastly developed across Eurasian land34, through which many goods 
were exchanged to and from China. In terms of technology transfer, China was innovator and 
technological innovations were “poured into Europe in a continuous stream in the first thirteen 
centuries of the Christian era”35.  
Culturally, the Confucian Chinese state had an anti-commercial attitude36. Though the Chinese 
state aimed at self-sufficiency, they still could tolerate and absorb foreign ideology and ideas37. In 
                                                 
29 Brown (1986). 
30 Brown (1986: 8) states that the extent of the commercial contacts that developed between the Roman Empire and 
Han Dynasty China around two thousand years ago and the flouring trade which existed sporadically thereafter are 
not widely appreciated.  
31 Frank (1998: 5) states that “If any regions were predominant in the world economy before 1800, they were in Asia. 
If any economy had a ‘central’ position and role in the world economy and its possible hierarchy of ‘centers,’ it was 
China”.  
32 Brown (1986: 8) and Frank (1998: 5). 
33 Colin Simkin (1968): The Traditional Trade of Asia, London: Oxford University Press. It is cited in Brown (1986). 
34 Brown (1986) and Frank (1998). 
35 Needham, J. (1971). Science and civilization in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It is cited in 
Brown (1986). 
36 Swanson (1982: 15). This attitude was related to the traditional suspicion of merchant, who held a very low 
position in the Chinese social scale.  
37 Ibid: “Its ability to do so can be likened to grafting”. They attempted to graft things from others in need and those 
grafted cells later became indistinguishable from the organism.   
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a commercial sense, “the Chinese government played an active role in regulating trade”38 with 
foreigners. As early as at least Han Dynasty, China had developed the “tribute system”39. 
Following this system, “barbarian emissaries would bring gifts in tribute as testimony to the 
vassalage of their nations to China. In response, the Chinese would generously bestow presents 
upon them”40. Though indifferent in feeling of trading with barbarian, China’s tolerance led to 
the growth of international trade.  
Along with the development of trade, China had set up extensive regulations on it. With these 
regulations, the Chinese government attempted to retain control in hand while the foreign trade 
became extensive and significant to national revenue. Taxes on commerce had been widely used 
and were of great importance to the national treasury41. Besides, a more extensive regulation 
framework had been also developed. In the closing years of the 10th century (Tang dynasty), 
China declared the state monopoly of trade, induced foreign traders coming by granting special 
import licences, and established inspectorates for Maritime trade42. Outside merchants could 
make commercial exchange with the Chinese at tribute meetings, but it was monitored closely by 
the government by predesignating the time and place of the meetings. However, the Chinese 
provincial officials, as well as traders, “were well aware of diversity of people and cultures and 
recognized the potential for a flourishing trade”43 at those borders.  By these regulations, China 
sought to sanitize and milk her foreign trade44. Though these regulations demonstrate attitude of 
superiority on one side, they also manifest some consideration of mutual benefits.  
3.2. The Second Phase: 1368 - 1842 
This is a period of China’s relative decline and that of Europe’s rise. The “Chinese superiority 
over time produced a dormancy that manifest itself in distain for the very things that led to the 
development of Western seapower prior to the twentieth century: commercial pursuits and the 
establishment of colonies”45.  Although China was the “center” of the world economy prior to the 
                                                 
38 Brown (1986: 13). 
39 Swanson ((1982: 13). The tribute system was originally established as a defence system to protect the sovereignty. 
Later on it evolved into a diplomatic and political system and further into a trade system.   
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid: “Under the Tong and Song, customs revenue from trade assumed great importance to the treasury/” 
42 Brown (1986: 13-14).  
43 Hutcheon (1996:11). 
44 Brown (1986: 14). 
45 Swanson (1982: 15). 
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10th century, this position had been threatened due to development of Western seapower since 
then on.  
China had also recognized the significance of seapower, but it was struggling between 
continentalism and maritime ideology46, while led to its short-lived maritime power. In the early 
15th century, China had a progressive attitude toward exploitation of the sea, which led to a series 
of naval voyages into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the years between 1405 and 
1433, Zheng He was commissioned to seven diplomatic expenditures to southern Asian countries 
to promote trade, the success of which proved that “China was the supreme world seapower”47 
that was unmatched by any other nation. However, Chinese seapower declined soon after those 
voyages due to a number of political, military, social, and economic factors from internal48. Up to 
the Opium War, the Chinese had been deemphasizing the maritime power despite the ascendancy 
of the maritime spirit in the world. In this period, piracy and smuggling had become a widespread 
calling. As a consequence, China didn’t take a progressive attitude but turned more inward and 
receded from trading with foreigners49. This led to a distain feeling of China side for foreign 
commerce. Meanwhile, foreigners were still attracted by the profit of trade with China. In this 
period, more and more foreign traders set up their businesses and increased their presence in 
China, such as Portuguese in 1531, Spanish in 1575, Dutch 1604, English in 1637 and Russian in 
161850.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese government reinforced the tributary system. The first Ming emperor, 
once taking position of emperor, immediately re-established this system. “He ordered missions to 
proceed to peripheral states such as Japan, Annam, Champa, and Korea, where it was proclaimed 
that all who wished to enter into relations with China must acknowledge the suzerainty of the 
new emperor. Very soon some of these states sent reciprocal missions to Peking”51. However, 
this tributary system was threatened in the Qing dynasty by the two first treaties with western 
countries, Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727) treaties with Russia. Under these treaties, there 
was to be “free travel between the two countries by their citizens having proper passports and 
                                                 
46 Swanson (1982: 28). 
47 Ibid.  
48 See Swanson (1982: 40-43) for detailed discussion. 
49 Brown (1986: 15). 
50 Brown (1986: 16). 
51 Swanson (1982: 29). 
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wishing to carry on commerce and other private business”, and “Russian trade caravans were to 
be permitted to arrive in Peking once every three years and to stay for 80 days, and Russia could 
trade without paying duties on the goods it exported and imported.”52 These demonstrated that 
Russia was active in promoting trade with China. However, the border trade proposed by these 
treaties didn’t develop very well, partly because these agreements didn’t fit well into the tributary 
system, and partly because Chinese side lacked of interests53.  
In this period, foreign trade was carried on under a system of tight control and supervision, 
representative by “Gong Hong” system54. The “Gong Hong” system emerged in Guangzhou as an 
officially licensed guild of merchant houses, which was governed by a code of articles that 
defined how they should deal with foreign traders. Under this system, foreign trade was 
constrained to certain locations (often at borders, after which the trade system was named as 
border trade.) and to dealing with quasi-monopolistic partners. The regulations in the period were 
much more severe than previous phase, and thus also created opponent feeling of foreign traders. 
It is argued that China’s indifference to trade with foreigners was because the Chinese rulers 
considered the empire to be self-sufficient, containing all they would ever need. Thus, the close 
control can be understood as protection of their resources from being exploited. These institutions 
reflected attitude of the emperor or the government, however, they were inconsistent with 
interests of traders and local officials. They sought to bypass some controls.  
3.3. The Third Phase: 1842 - 1911 
In this period, China was opened up by foreign military power. Foreign attackes broke down 
China’s system. Thus, a hostile feeling was created on the Chinese side. Meanwhile, foreigners 
expanded their penetration quickly as a consequence of “opening up” of China’s ports.  
This period started in the year 1842 at the end of the Opium War. This war was started by the 
British trading company who didn’t satisfy with the trade control of China and didn’t like to carry 
silver from the UK to exchange goods in China. They smuggled opium into China, which led to 
the opium war (1939-1942). The UK took military action to invade China and to force Qing 
Dynasty to accept this kind of trade. Due to the weakening of Qing dynasty in both technology 
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and military, the ruler was forced to sign an unequal Nanjing Treaty by which Hongkong was 
ceded in perpetuity to the UK. This represented the beginning of new trade system: “treaty port” 
system, which replaced the tribute system. 
The Western powers successfully destroyed the official Chinese border trade system, and 
replaced it with treaties to colonize parts of China. They sought to secure exclusive rights in 
various regions of China. Following the Nanjing Treaty, other Western powers, such as France, 
Russian, Germany, Japan, and so on, took similar actions to gain their treaty ports. From 1842 to 
1930, “no less than 105 open ports were established, of which 73 were opened by treaties and 
conventions, and [only] 32 were opened voluntarily by the Chinese government”55. As a result, 
China was divided into “sphere of influence” with leased areas and special concessions. By 
treaty, these treaty ports became foreign colonies on China’s own land. At the treaty ports, 
foreign traders obtained much autonomy. They were allowed to reside, to pursue commercial 
trade without restraints, and to carry on trade with whatever persons they please56. They were 
even granted to extraterritorial rights and to engage in manufacturing and thus the Chinese 
internal customs duties were limited.  
By these treaties, foreign traders started to exploit China’s resource and market. Many joint 
ventures had been established, and they were primarily under foreign control. However, due to 
the cultural or institutional differences, foreigners found difficulties in operating in China, even in 
the westernized treaty ports. As a consequence, the comprador (Maiban in Chinese) system 
emerged57. The comprador system became a bridge to link Chinese and western commerce, 
enabling “fusion of western technology, capital, and managerial skills with the native financial 
institutions and commercial ability of Chinese”58. The compradors helped foreigners to face with 
difficulties in language, non-standard currency, nonstandardized system of weights and measures, 
complex credit, commercial relationship and guild system in China59.  
Though forced to cede ports to foreigners, the Chinese government didn’t let foreigners dominate 
all areas and all fields. The government struggled to remain some control. A typical case is 
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mining sector. This sector was dominated by Sino-foreign enterprises, not by foreigners or 
Chinese. It was because (1) mining was carried out outside of the treaty ports, which required the 
cooperation of the Chinese; (2) it needed modern technology and capital which China was lack 
of; and (3) China was especially sensitive to foreign control over her mineral resources60. For this 
last reason, the government had promulgated a series of mining regulations in 1898, 1899, 1902, 
1904, 1908, 1914 and 193061. Through these regulations, China imposed the Chinese majority 
ownership to mining enterprises, and stipulated that they could employ only Chinese except 
foreign engineers. China was successful in preventing at least formal foreign control over mining 
enterprises62. By recognizing the technological advance of foreigners, some leaders accepted that 
“China must accept a measure of western technology and build up her own industries in order to 
be strong enough to avoid foreign domination”63. As the Chinese refused to accept foreign 
dominance, many Sino-foreign economic interactions took place through which Chinese made 
use of foreigners and of foreign techniques to begin Chinese ventures64.  
However, the progress towards modernization was very slow due to the conservative attitudes of 
the Chinese bureaucracy65. On the other hand, the government concerned more about political 
and military power instead of economic gains. This made Chinese merchants unenthusiastic 
about participation in government-sponsored ventures. Instead, these merchants actively 
participated in their own ventures or in collaboration with foreign enterprises. In addition, many 
overseas Chinese returned to China, as a response to the hospital attitudes of the Chinese 
government, and invested in many industries such as banks, infrastructures and other enterprises.  
It can be argued that the partitioning of China in this period gave birth to the first open door 
policy. However, this open door policy was towards China, but not initiated by China, because 
China was out of the decision making66. The invasion and exploitation of western powers gave 
Chinese a feeling of national humiliation. Hence, it is no surprise that Chinese grew a hostile 
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attitude towards foreigners, and later initiated national boycotts against foreign powers and the 
rights recovery movement. 
3.4. The Fourth Phase: 1912 - 1949 
This period started in the year when the Republic state replaced the emperor. However, in this 
period China was in a chaotic situation which was characteristic with civil war and the anti-
Japanese war which was associated with the WWII in the Pacific. In this period, the attitude of 
China towards foreign investors was mixed. The republic government aimed to strengthen its 
national economy by adopting foreign technologies.  
The treaty port system continued in the early years of this period, but it withered later due to (1) 
Chinese nationalism, (2) Japanese aggression, and (3) the preoccupation of the Western powers 
with war in Europe67. The First World War, Second World War and Russian revolution drew 
much of the energies of western powers.  
In the early stage of this period, Chinese and foreign businessmen jointly developed a thriving 
economy in treaty ports, which “is indicated explicitly by such statistics as the presence of 20 
Sino-foreign banks alongside the 43 foreign and 141 Chinese banks in the modern banking sector 
in 1925”68. The Chinese and foreign concerns became more common and thus they cooperated 
more at industry level. With the growth of the power of the Republic, the extraterritorial status of 
treaty port system in the treaty ports was diminished. Their operations were first obstructed and 
then terminated by the Japanese during the war69. Though the treaty ports resumed after the war, 
but were discriminated by the government. This system came to an end in 1943 by the Sino-
American and Sino-British treaties, except the colony of Hongkong70.  
At the same time, the Chinese government sought to take back the rights previously granted 
foreigners. They imposed restrict control over certain areas of the economy. For example, in 
mining sector, the regulations stipulated the Chinese majority in shareholders, Chinese majority 
in the board of a mining enterprise, Chinese holding of chairman of the board of directors and 
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that of the managing director. While China still absorbed foreign technical assistance, the western 
expertise was gradually supplanted by Chinese technical ability in many areas of modern industry 
because Chinese people had obtained experiences from training both abroad in universities and at 
home under tutelage of foreign experts71. Due to the bitter experience with Westerners, the 
Chinese government had a more positive attitude toward overseas Chinese. They was playing a 
significant role in this period in the struggling for modernization. 
This was a period of political chaos and warfare. The Chinese government sought to achieve the 
control over the economy. However, “the Sino-Japanese and civil wars resulted in complete 
demoralization of both the domestic and foreign sectors of the economy, the latter having lost its 
preferred standing and having encountered official hostility”72.  
3.5. The Fifth Phase: 1949 - 1977 
This period started with the establishment of a unified China in 1949. Due to the previous bitter 
experience with foreigners and ideological distance with capitalism, the new China sought to 
reconstruct the national economy by nationalizing the industry.  
Hence, foreign interests were expulsed by China establishing a socialist planned economy, which 
generated fear among western investors. Meanwhile, the Chinese assisted the Koreans to fight 
against the aggression of the US. The political climate towards China was then worsened by the 
Korean War73. As a response, the US frozen Chinese assets in December 1950. This US-led 
boycott triggered China to take similar action towards FDI as well. This action was not only 
towards US investment, and was extended to British investment in April 1951 as well74. At the 
end, the British merchants chose to leave the mainland in 1952.  
In 1950s, while Western and Japanese enterprises were confiscated, Mao Zedong’s “lean-to-one-
side” policy referred to maintain substantial economic relations with Soviet Union. In order to 
implement the reconstruction and modernization of the national economy, China’s lack of capital 
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and technology asked for loans and technical assistance from Soviet Union75. As a consequence, 
a total of 10800 Soviet experts involved in the Soviet aid program between 1950 and 195976. Yet, 
due to increasing ideological conflicts, China ended this policy at the end of 1950s. All Soviet 
experts withdrew suddenly, which left China to a difficulty time.  
After the withdrawing of western merchants, China was left in an economic autarky77. However, 
this does not mean China was completely isolated from the outside of the world. First, there were 
investments from overseas Chinese because, traditionally, they were not regarded as foreigners. 
Secondly, in face of capital deficit, the Chinese leadership accepted the sellers’ credit which was 
ideologically acceptable because it was not regarded as a form of foreign debts78. Thirdly, the 
Chinese leadership had taken import substitution approach to achieve the goal of self-reliance. 
After the economic collapse from the Great Leap Forward, they experimented with export 
promotion measures, importing technologies that were needed and exporting products from these 
technologies. However these experiments were constrained within certain areas.  
The self-reliance had been a highly stressed theme and goal in the economic relations with 
foreigners in this period. Yet, there is a disagreement within the Chinese leadership on which 
path of development China would achieve it. This led to the economic reform in 1978. 
3.6. The Sixth Phase: 1978 onwards 
In order to catch up with the developed countries, the Chinese leadership urged to modernize the 
economy, which quested for capital and expertise to assist the modernization process. Though 
China had accepted sellers’ credit from the outside of world, the amount was limited and couldn’t 
meet the requirement of modernization. Therefore, opening the door to absorb more capital 
became necessary. Following the policy endorsement in 1978, compensation trade agreements 
became accepted. In the following year, the Equity Joint Venture Law was promulgated, which 
authorizes the acceptance of foreign equity capital. Though there was doubt on how far the policy 
could be carried on, the progress of the past 25 years proves the insisting attitude of the Chinese 
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leadership towards the opening. In 1984, both Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang stated that “the 
policy of opening to the outside world is a basic policy of China. Whatever it changes, it can only 
change toward taking a more relaxed attitude”79, which stressed the China’s firm commitment to 
the open-door policy. Nevertheless, the government still imposed control over foreign investment 
to (1) guaranteeing mutual benefits, and (2) avoiding “unhealthy tendency” coming with foreign 
investment. 
Meanwhile, foreign investors also changed their negative attitudes towards investing in China. 
Due to the ideological constraints, foreign investors were afraid of investing in China at the 
beginning. They were sceptical about the continuation of the policy. Many foreign investors 
didn’t want to be part of an experiment despite Chinese assurances that their interests will be 
protected80. Thus, their response was fairly reluctant. The foreign investment grew very slow due 
to their unwillingness to commit themselves to businesses in China, which partly is also due to 
the lack of a sound legal framework and sufficient infrastructure in China. However, this didn’t 
decrease the China’s attractiveness, with a biggest potential domestic market in the world and a 
rapid economic growth potential, to foreign investors. By 1984, China had learned to improve the 
legal framework, and the economic reform and growth also helped foreign investors to build up 
more confidence. In this process, many regulations and policies had been established to solidify 
conditions of investment in China which led to a rapid growth period of FDI. With these 
improvements, China’s attractiveness takes on its function. As a consequence, more and more 
foreign investors actively take steps to (re-)enter into China.  
This period witnesses for the first time that China took her initiative to open the door to the 
outside world under her own willingness, not by external military force. Due to the lack of 
experiences in dealing with foreign investment, China has been in a learning process. Gradually, 
the Chinese leadership has gained confidence and therefore liberalized more the regulatory 
framework over foreign investment. This period also witnesses the growth of foreign investors’ 
confidence and attitude changes towards investing in China. Though foreign investors 
complained, and still complain, the imperfection of legal framework and the administrative 
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bureaucracy81, they perceive China as a must destination. Learning from history, China doesn’t 
give out the control rights when opening the door. The major principle China insists on in this 
process is interdependence and “equality and mutual benefit”82. On the one side, China proposes 
incentives to induce FDI, and on the other hand, China also imposes (strict) control over FDI 
such as industry constraints, local contents and export requirements.  
In the implementation of these policies, however, local governments have their own pursuits that 
are not always consistent with those of the central government. As a consequence of 
decentralization, local governments have increasingly become entrepreneurs and major 
stakeholders in local enterprises, regardless of the policy instructions of the central government83. 
All regions, recognizing the significance of FDI to the local economy, aim at attracting FDIs, 
which leads to locational competition, in terms of offering better preferential treatments, for FDI. 
Their competition leads to high inflow of FDI on the one side and may also lose the overall rents 
that the central government aims to gain. In a word, this period is characterized by more positive 
attitudes from both sides. The tension between the Chinese and foreign investors exists all the 
time, which has led to the evolution of institutions.  
3.7. Summary  
The brief overview of the history of the economic relationship with foreign investors 
demonstrates several themes: (1) China is always attractive to foreign investors in one way or 
another; (2) Chinese historical attitudes towards FDI shifts over time; (3) tension between them 
exists all the time; (4) this tension and their attitudes have shaped the institutional building of 
China concerning foreign investment; and (5) technological advance determines the dominant 
side.  
Figure 6 outlines these changes throughout the historical phases. China’s attitude towards foreign 
trade and investment has changed from indifference in the pre-Ming dynasty era to demanding in 
the reform era, which was accompanied with the exchange of the position of technological 
advance. Even in the period of foreign dominance, China was also aware of the applying foreign 
technology to strengthen her own muscle, though there was a hostile attitude towards foreign 
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presence. In parallel, the foreign attitude toward trade with or investing in China has changed 
from enthusiastic in the pre-Ming dynasty to aggressive and exploitative in the late Ming and 
Qing dynasty, to hostile in the Mao era, and to positive again in the reform era.  
In all phases of the history except in the Mao era (1949-1978), China has always been an 
attractive destination of foreign trade or investment. Originally, it was mainly due to the advance 
of China’s technology and riches in goods, and later on resources and the big domestic market 
became attraction. Their attitude deviation and technological gap created tension in economic 
transactions, which further determined institutional building concerning these transactions. In the 
early phases when China was dominant, China developed tribute system for mutual benefits, 
while imposing control to maintain the dominance. In the middle phases when foreign powers 
obtained dominance by military force, China was forced to grant extraterritorial rights to 
foreigners at treaty ports, and yet struggled to remain control beyond ports. In the Mao era, 
hostility from both side led to an isolation situation of China. Perceiving the need of foreign 
capital and technology, in the reform era, China voluntarily opened its door to foreign investors. 
However, learning from the bitter experience in history, China developed the institutional 
framework on a base of equality and mutual benefit. The strong tension between Chinese and 
foreigners led to the evolution of institutions gradually in this phase.  
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Figure 6  Attitude Changes of Both Sides: historical review 
In addition, it should be noted that there is an internal tension between the central government 
and local governments or business societies. This is due to their interests inconsistency. The 
central government concerns more about the political power of the country and its sovereign 
security, while local officials or business societies concern more about economic gains from 
foreign investment or trade. This tension determines what institutions will be built at the local 
level. In this process, two layers can be distinguished. On the first layer, the attitude tension 
between Chinese and foreign side determines what institutions (with particular respect to FDI 
policies) will be developed at the central level. On the second layer, the attitude tension between 
the central government and local governments or business societies determines what institutions 
will be built at the local level, by interacting with foreign investors. Nevertheless, the most 
crucial part is located at the central government’s attitude that dominates over-time changes of 
the FDI policy. 
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4. Evolution of Institutions in the reform era: on path or off path? 
Since the opening policy was first endorsed in 1978, China has been in a gradual process of 
improving the institutional framework that evolves towards more liberalized and more foreign 
concerned. Though the open-door policy is generally claimed to be a path-broken institution, it 
nevertheless didn’t deviates completely from the previous path. As discussed before, self-reliance 
is still one of the major concerns of institution building in this stage.  
4.1. Overview of Institutional evolution 
Since 1970s, the Chinese leadership has learnt that the open-door policy can be a means to foster 
China’s ability to achieve modernization and self-reliance. Deng Xiaoping, as designer of the 
economic reform, stated that “The most important thing we have learned is to reply mainly on our 
own efforts. That does not mean we should not seek outside help, but the main thing is to reply 
on our own efforts. Through self-reliance we can unit the people, inspire the whole country to 
work hard for prosperity, and thus make it easier to overcome the many difficulties in the way”84. 
Since 1978, the Chinese leadership has sought better institutional framework to attract and 
control FDI, which leads to the evolution of institutions that are influenced by attitudes of all 
interested parties. We discuss three aspects: ideological breakthroughs, governing laws, and 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These changes are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1  FDI-related institutional changes (Partly adapted from Van den Bulcke, et al 2003: 22) 
Phases Accessible locations Industry orientation Entry modes 
1979 - 1983 4 SEZs   EJVs 
1984 – 1988 14 open coastal cities,  
Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, 
Golden Triangle Areas 
Hainan island 
Liaodong and Shandong peninsulas 
Provisions for the encouragement 
of foreign investment with 
additional incentives for export, 
import substitution and high-tech 
project 
WFOEs,  
CJVs 
1989 – 1991 Pudong New Area in Shanghai   
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1992 – 1994 21 cities along the Yangtze River and 
in the Northeast 
Open retailing sector Umbrella 
companies 
1995 – 1998  Orientation directory of industries 
Open banking sector 
B share trading 
BOT 
1999 – 2000 Inland provinces by “Go-west” strategy  M&As 
2001 onwards  Other service sectors  
 
Ideological breakthrough: This is referred to those statements made by the CCPCC (Chinese 
Communist Party Central Congress) and the central leadership, which significantly deviate from 
the past in ideology and are supposed to provide guidance to the economic reform. Four 
ideological breakthroughs have occurred. The first was the first wave of “emancipation of mind” 
driven by the debate on “judge of truth”85 in 1978. This debate was ended with the speech of 
Deng Xiaoping at the Central Work Conference before the 3rd Plenum of 11th CCPCC, affirming 
that “practice is the sole criterion of truth”86. Following this ideology, the Chinese leadership 
endorsed the economic reform and open-door policy at the 3rd Plenum of 11th CCPCC, which 
deviated from the development path in the Mao’s time. The second was the endorsement of a 
socialist planned commodity economy at the 3rd Plenum of 12th CCPCC in 1984, by which the 
leadership has accepted elements of market in the economy, which deviated from a pure planned 
economy in the past. The third was the second wave of “emancipation of mind” after an 
ideological retreat as a consequence of the Tian’anmen Square Incident. Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 
“Southern Journey” re-affirmed the economic reform and open policies. In 1993, the 3rd Plenum 
of the 14th CCPCC endorsed the shift of economic system to a socialist market economy. This 
shift, though insisting on socialist, has highly appreciated the role of market in the economy, and 
further loosened the previous ideological constraints. The fourth was the third wave of 
“emancipation of mind” in 1997. The 15th CCPCC in 1997 affirmed that the private ownership is 
an important component of the economy. This ideological breakthrough has led to many other 
institutional changes that are highly related to foreign interests. These breakthroughs loosens the 
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control of planning instrument and strengthens the role of market instrument, while appreciating, 
besides state-owned ones, other economic components.  
Governing laws: Governing laws related to foreign investment are referred to those laws, 
regulations and policies that foreign investors should comply with. Soon after the decision on the 
open policy, the Equity Joint Venture (EJV) Law was promulgated in 1979. This law for the first 
time since 1949 welcomes foreign investment. This law legitimizes the status of equity joint 
ventures with foreign investors, while imposing certain control over them on a base of mutual 
benefits. In 1986, a national WFOE law was promulgated. This law permits foreign investors to 
set up exclusively wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China under certain conditions. This was 
considered as an important institutional breakthrough as China allowed foreign capitalist firms to 
establish on its soil territory of socialist. In 1988, the National People’s Congress passed the 
Contracted Joint Venture (CJV) Law. This law is less significant than the EJV Law and WFOE 
Law. However, it provided the official status of legitimacy to contracted joint ventures. In many 
aspects of the law, it is similar to the EJV Law. 
SEZs and Spatial Expansion: China’s open-door policy has a very important dimension of 
geography. In 1980, six months after the EJV Law, China established four SEZs, Shenzhen, 
Shantou, and Zhuhai in Guangdong province, and Xiamen in Fujian province. The motives to 
establish these SEZs were (1) to attract foreign capital and technology, (2) to promote exports 
and generate foreign exchange, and (3) to experiment with the open policy87. The striking feature 
of SEZs in China is that they are operating “under different institutional framework from the rest 
of China”88. These localities were delegated to prepare their own regulations89. Hence, the local 
authorities obtained a considerable degree of autonomy in organizing economic activities in SEZs 
without interference from the central government. To do the “experiment”, these localities 
received generous financial subsidies. Their success further reinforced the SEZ polices. In 1984, 
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the State Council granted another 14 coastal cities90 the similar status to the SEZs, by which they 
were authorized to provide foreign investors the same preferential treatment as hitherto available 
only in the four SEZs. This expansion was extended again in 1985, to three “delta regions”, 
Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and Golden Triangle Delta91, which was to satisfy those 
localities that are in coastal areas but were not selected in 198492. Since then, the expansion 
becomes a routine through which the government gradually permits wider regions to provide 
preferential treatment to receive foreign investment. In 1988, Hainan Island was separated from 
Guangdong province and elected to be a new province, meanwhile granted as the fifth SEZ in 
China. In the same year, Liaodong and Shandong peninsulas were granted as “coastal economic 
open areas”. In 1990, Pudong New Area was established in Shanghai and afterwards Shanghai 
was granted greater autonomy over foreign trade and investment. In 1992, the state authorized 
another 21 cities along the Yangtze River and in the Northeast to offer special incentives to 
foreign investors. Since then on, more river and border cities, and inland provincial cities have 
been open. A significant progress of the opening is the “go-west” strategy which was announced 
by the central government in September 1999, aiming at encouraging foreign investors to engage 
in the restructuring of the state-owned industrial enterprises in the western regions. All in all, the 
strategy demonstrates a full opening of China geographically. 
4.2. Path dependence 
We can’t interpret institutional changes in an isolated manner. We have to look for their historical 
sources along the past path. From the historical perspective, we can sort out three paths in the 
period before 1978 in terms of Chinese-foreign economic relations: Strong control over FDI with 
indifferent attitude, Weak control over FDI with reluctant attitude, Isolation from the West with 
hostile attitude. Currently, China opens the door to FDI. In this sense, it is a path break from the 
previous stage when China was closed to the West. Meanwhile, Chinese attitude towards FDI has 
changed from hostile to friendly with caution. This attitude is not completely new, which had 
already hints in the past. In addition, the current policy demonstrates strong control over FDI in 
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terms of locations and industries to invest, which were clearly reflected in previous stages. 
Though the open door policy is generally claimed as a path break event, it is also claimed that the 
leadership learnt to initiate this policy93. By learning, it is referred that the open-door policy 
followed the previous path in a certain way. Before the reform in 1978, the leadership has had 
experiences with small-scale experiments or overseas Chinese investment. These experiences 
reinforce the leadership’s confidence in opening the door to FDI. To understand the institutional 
changes better, below, we trace the path of open-door policy back from a long-shot view.  
Off Path: It is to a large degree true that the current FDI policy breaks the previous path in the 
Mao’s time. The distinction is that China invites FDI now, while refused FDI in the previous 
stage. Ideologically, this is a path break in terms of attitudes towards FDI. In Mao’s time, though 
China did accept some types of foreign investment such as the seller’s credit, overseas Chinese 
investment and import substitution, China refused FDI since it was regarded as a foreign debt 
which was ideologically not acceptable. The open door policy broke these restrictions, inviting 
FDI into China. The most striking movement is to allow FDI to be hosted in a WFOE. Sure, these 
show that new institutions create a path deviating from the previous one.   
On Path: In many respects, however, the current institutional changes are on path from a longer 
historical view. First, the current policy also imposes strong control over FDI. In the earlier 
stages prior to the Opium War, China exerted strong control over foreign economic relations. 
Even the in the stage of foreign fragmentation, the government was intended to exert strong 
control, at least in regions beyond treaty ports, as well. In the Mao’ time, the control was exerted 
to extreme. Similar to the past, the initial FDI regulations were very cautious about foreign 
ownership, as demonstrated in the governing laws. Although this control has been gradually 
loosened to accept WFOEs, they should be established on conditions of (1) employing advanced 
technology, (2) developing new products or producing import substitutes, or (3) having an export 
ratio of over 50%. In addition, China has developed the industry policies to exert control over 
industries to invest. The “Orientation Directory of Industries for FDI” categorizes into FDI-
encouraging industries, FDI-restricted industries and FDI-prohibited industries to guide the 
operation of promoting FDI. Second, the SEZs are very similar to tribute system or port system in 
their operation. Under the tribute system, all foreign trades were constrained in certain locations 
                                                 
93 See Shirk (1994) and Reardson (1998).  
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and were banned beyond those locations. Port systems, due to the unequal treaty, offered foreign 
investors more autonomy in those ports. Beyond the ports, the Chinese government intended to 
exert strong control, though weak in effect. Even in the Mao’s time, those import substitution 
projects were confined to certain bases. The SEZs are operated in a similar way. The first four 
SEZs were initiated as experiments, hosting FDI in those regions to learn how to manage them. 
In SEZs, looser control is imposed on FDI than beyond these SEZs. Third, the central 
government, though imposing control by law, can only exert a weak control over FDI in effect. 
This is once again mirrored in the history. There is always a tension between the central and local 
governments, or between the government and business societies. Local governments and business 
societies concerned more about their economic gains that triggered them to make use of the 
flexibility or ambiguity in policy to collaborate with foreign investors, which in turn weakens the 
central control. Fourth, the attitudes also have their historical path. The current policy 
demonstrates an attitude of mixture of friendliness with caution. The component of caution is 
more in a political sense. Due to the past experience, China is afraid of loosing her sovereign 
control to foreigners who can exert their control by using economic power, which has led to the 
strict control over FDI at the central level. The component of friendliness is more in an economic 
sense. Economically, China needs to absorb capital and technology from the West in order to 
improve her economic capability, which has led to the cooperation. Especially at the local level, 
local governments and business societies wish to obtain more economic rents by cooperating with 
FDI. Last, but not least, China has always insisted on self-reliance although the open door policy 
has been issued, and insisted on some central control (planning) while a market economic system 
has been implemented.  
4.3. Path of Institutional building 
Though it is often claimed that the FDI-related institutional building in the reform era is a path-
break event, it is more appropriate to claim that it is of path-dependence with some deviation, see 
Figure 7.  
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Figure 7  Path of FDI-related Institutional Building 
 
Why is it a path-dependence? “Path dependence means that history matter”94. Therefore, we can 
not simply trace back to the previous stage to claim the FDI institutions are off the path, though it 
does go off the path of the previous stage. Historically, the current institutional building takes 
many components from the past. Ideologically, although China accepts FDI especially those in a 
form of WFOE, China insists on self-reliance which has long been a feature of the Chinese 
institutions and attitudes when facing foreign participation. Local governments may weaken the 
central control due to locational competition and their eager needs for FDI, they do attempt or 
have intention to gain its own capability to develop local economy. Secondly, though China 
followed different patterns of path in the past, the history demonstrated that China’s control over 
FDI leans to weak once foreign investment gains high penetration in China in economic or 
political sense. In the first and second phases, though China could exert strong control over 
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foreign trade, this control did become weaker when these trades became more extensive. In the 
third and fourth phases, with the expanding of foreign fragmentation in China and the weakening 
of the Chinese government, the central control was also becoming weaker. The fifth phase could 
be seen as an adjustment in response to the past experience. Since the economic reform in 1978, 
we see a break from the fifth phase in term of opening door and accepting market components, 
however, we see more a reflection of the historical path in terms of FDI development in China. 
On the one hand, the central government follows the previous stages, exerting strong control over 
FDI by defining their organizational forms, restricting their investment locations and industries 
and so on. On the other hand, the central control has been weakened over time with the increasing 
of FDI. Regions that can offer incentive policies to FDI have been expanded from 4 SEZs to 
more open cities and then to all over the country. The selection of organizational mode, in most 
of cases, has been left to a choice of foreign investors themselves. Here, we clearly see a similar 
development pattern to those before 1949.  
What are those deviations? It is mainly an ideological matter. Historically, China didn’t show 
such a positive attitude towards FDI. In the earlier three phases, China was indifferent or 
reluctant to accept FDI. In the fourth phase, though China had recognized the significance of 
using FDI, China didn’t accept it with a very open attitude. In the fifth phase, the FDI was even 
banned. It is in the current phase when China doesn’t only recognize the significance of FDI, but 
also positively took steps to absorb them while imposing appropriate control. However, should 
we have to regard it as a deviation? Not necessary. It is clear that institutions in each phase are 
influenced by attitudes and behaviors in previous phases. In this sense, history matters, which 
then refers to path dependence.  
5. Conclusion 
It is interesting to looking back the historical development in terms of China’s foreign relations. 
This historical exploration helps us to understand what attitudes China has had towards foreign 
investors, what foreign investors have had towards investing in China, and how they change over 
time. Historically, China’s attitudes have been changed, although it doesn’t change much at the 
local level for pursuing economic gains. This change is influenced by China’ relative economic 
power and their attitudes towards China. The change in attitudes further influences institutional 
building. 
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In this process, historical attitudes matter. Attitudes are built on the relative (economic) capability 
and the behaviour of the other side. The initial attitude of indifference was generated on a ground 
of Chinese superiority. The following attitude of reluctance was due to the increasing foreign 
participation and their significance. The attitude of hostility was developed as a consequence of 
foreign exploitation and fragmentation. The current attitude of welcoming FDI is a result of need 
for foreign advanced technologies and capital supply and the perception of their performance. 
Meanwhile, the historical attitudes have formed some genes in society which explain the source 
of caution towards FDI.  
The historical analysis shows that institutions are outcomes of interaction between the 
government and foreign participants. The government’s institutional building is influence by the 
previous behaviour of foreign participants. The foreign enthusiastic participation in the early days 
pushed the government to reluctantly accept foreign trade by establishing institutions to control 
them. Their exploitations in the 19th and the early 20th century created a hostile attitude towards 
FDI and, due part to this, led to the ban on FDI in the Mao’s time. In the reform era, the Chinese 
leadership gradually changes the attitude as a response to the behaviour and performance of FDI, 
which led to a more open institutional framework and looser control over FDI.    
The more interesting is that this interaction more directly takes place at the local level. Given the 
size of China in geography, the local governments are responsible for implementing the central 
policies. Those interactions between local governments and foreign investors determine how 
these institutions are enforced and how foreign investors respond to them.  
To conclude, we can sort out, from the historical attitude changes, important actors that shape the 
path of institutional change. They are the central government, local governments/local business 
societies, and foreign investors/their home countries. Their attitude and behaviour together shape 
the development path of institutions. Therefore, to understand the institutional change in China in 
the reform era, a process approach is required. This also helps use understand how the institutions 
may evolve in the future. For example, the increasing influence of FDI on the local economy may 
push the government to strengthen the control again to protect its own benefits. Some studies 
have looked into the process of the institutional changes95. However, it is at an overall level or 
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national level. The local-level studies deserve more attention96. The most interesting questions 
are how foreign investors and local governments collaborate to circumvent the central control 
policies, and how their relationship influences institutional building and shapes organizational 
choices of foreign investors. These questions will be further studied.  
Reference 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, Keping Li, Thomas Richardson, and Raju Singh (2002). “Recentralization in 
China?”. International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper WP/02/168. www.imf.org. 
Berthélemy J-C and S. Démurger (2000). “Foreign Direct Investment and economic Growth: 
Theory and Application to China”. Review of Development Economics, 4(2): 140-155. 
Betra, Geeta, et al (2003). “Voice of firms from the world business environment survey”. World 
Bank. www.worldbank.org.  
Braunstein, Elissa and Gerald Epstein (2002). “Bargaining Power and Foreign Direct Investment 
in China: Can 1.3 Billion Consumers Tame the Multinationals?”, PERI Working Paper Series 
2002-45, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 
http://www.umass.edu/peri/ 
Brown, David G. (1986). Partnership with China: Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures in Historical 
Perspective. Boulder and London: Westview Press. 
Cheng, L.K and Y.K. Kwan (2000). “What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct 
investment? The Chinese experience”. Journal of International Economics, 51: 379-400. 
China, Constitution of the People’s Republic China (English version). 
english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.  
China MII. Fact sheet 2003, Ministry of Information Industry. www.mii.gov.cn.  
                                                 
96 E.g. Roehrig (1994). 
 34
China MOC. Ministry of Commerce of China, (previous named as Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation). www.mofcom.gov.cn.  
China NBS. National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn.  
Chow, Irene Hau Siu and Lane Kelley (1999). “Adaptive strategies of the large hongs in an Era 
of Political change”. In L. Kelly and Y. Luo (eds.), China 2000: Emerging Business Issues. 
London: SAGE Publications. Pp.217-234. 
Dees, S. (1998). “Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and effects”. Economics of 
Planning, 31(2/3): 175-194. 
Deng Xiaoping (1984). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 
Denzau, Authur T. and D.C. North (1994). “Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions”, 
KYKLOS, 47(Fasc.1): 3-31. 
Dunning, J.H. (1979). “Explaining Changing patterns of international production: in defence of 
the Eclectic theory”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, November: 269-296. 
Dunning, J.H. (1981). International Production and the Multinational Enterprise. London: George 
Allen & Unwin. 
EIU (2003). Country Profile 2003: China. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
www.eiu.com/schedule.  
Fang, James and David Tang (1988). “The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law: Defining the 
legislative History and Interpreting the Statute”. Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.2. 
Frank, Andre Gunder (1998). ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Fu, Jun (2000). Institutions and Investments: Foreign Direct Investment in China during an Era of 
Reforms. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
 35
Howe, Christopher, Y.Y. Kueh and Rotert Ash (2003). China’s Economic Reform: A study with 
documents. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Huang, Yasheng (1998). “FDI in China: an Asian Perspective”, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore. 
Huang, Yasheng (2001). Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era. New 
York: The Cambridge University Press.  
Hutcheon, Robin (1996). China-Yellow. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 
Kelley, Lane and Y. Luo (1999). China 2000: Emerging Business Issues. London: SAGE 
Publications.  
Khan, Zafar Shah (2001). “Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment in China”, World Bank 
Discussion papers, 130. 
Lardy, Nicholas R. (1995). “The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment in China’s economic 
transformation”. The China Quarterly, 144(Dec. 1995): 1065-1082. 
Liang, Guoyong (2004), New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial 
Development in China. PhD thesis, Erasmus University. 
Li, Feng and Jing Li (1999). Foreign Investment in China. London: MacMillan Press. 
Liu, X., H. Song, et al (1997). “Country Characteristics and foreign ddirect investment in China: 
a panel data analysis”. Weltirtschaftliches Archiv, 133(2): 313-329. 
Luo, Yadong (2000). Multinational Corporations in China. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business 
School Press.  
Luo, Yadong (2002). Multinational Enterprises in Emerging Markets. Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Business School Press.  
 36
Nee, Victor. (1992). Organizational Dynamics of market transition: Hybrid forms, property 
rights, and mixed economy in China. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1): 1-27. 
Nolan, Peter. (1995). China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall. London: Macmillan Press. 
North, Douglass (1990). Institutions, Institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (2002). Foreign Direct Investment in China: challenges and prospects for regional 
development. OECD. 
Oppers, Erik (1997). “Macroeconomic cycles in China”. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
working paper WP/97/135. www.imf.org.  
Pearson, Margaret M. (1991). Joint Ventures in People’s Republic of China. Princeton University 
Press.  
Prasad, Eswar (2004). “China’s Growth and Integration into the World Economy: prospects and 
challenges”, International Monetary Fund (IMF) occasional paper 2004/232, www.imf.org.  
Qian, Y. (2002). How Reform Worked in China. Discussion paper No.3447 at Center for 
Economic Policy Research, www.cepr.org. 
Reardon, Lawrence C. (1998). “Learning how to open the door: areassessement of China’s 
opening strategy”. The China Quarterly, 155 (Sept. 1998): 479-511. 
Roehrig, Michael Franz (1994). Foreign Joint Ventures in Contemporary China. London: 
Macmillan.  
Rumbaugh Thomas and Nicolas and Blancher (2004). “China: International Trade and WTO 
Accession”. International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper 04/36. 
Shan, Jordan, et al (1999). “Causality between FDI and economic growth”, in Wu, Y. (eds.), 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in China, Edward Elgar. 
 37
Shirk, Susan L. (1994). How China Opened Its Door. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution. 
Stuttard, J.B. (2000). The New Silk Road. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Swanson, Bruce (1982). Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A history of China’s quest for seapower. 
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press 
Tang, Zongli (1996). China’s Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao Time. New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, Inc. 
UNCTAD (2003). World Investment Report 2003: FDI policies for development. Geneva: United 
Nations 
Van den Bulcke, et al (2003). European Union Direct Investment in China. London: Routledge. 
WDI (2004). World Development Indicators. www.worldbank.org/data/wdi.  
Wei, Shangjin (1995). “Attracting foreign direct investment: has China reached its potential?”. 
China Economic Review, 6(2): 187-199 
Wei, Shangjin (2000). “Sizing up foreign direct investment in China and India”, Center for 
Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 85, Stanford 
University. 
Wei, Y. and Liu X. (2001). Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Impact. 
Edward Elgar. 
Wei, Y., Liu X., et al (1999). “The regional distribution of foreign direct investment in China”. 
Regional Studies, 33(9): 857-867. 
Wei, Yingqi  (2003). “Foreign Direct Investment in China”, Lancaster University Management 
school Working Paper 2003/002. http://www.lums.co.uk/publications  
 38
WTO (2001). Protocol of China’s Accession to WTO. 
http://www/wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm.  
Yang, Dali L. (1994). Reform and the Restructuring of Central-local Relations. In David S.G. 
Goodman and G. Segal (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, trade and regionalism. London: 
Routledge; 59-98. 
Zhang, Kevin Hongli (1999). “Hod does FDI interact with economic growth in a large 
developing country? The case of China”. Economic Systems, 21(4): 291-304. 
Zhang, Kevin Hongli (2000). “Why is US direct investment in China so small?”. Contemporary 
Economic Policy, 18(1): 82-94. 
Zhao, Hongxin and Gangti Zhu (2000). “Location factors and Country of origin difference: an 
empirical analysis”. Multinational Business Review, 8(1): 60-73. 
Zseng, Wanda and Harm Zebregs (2002). “Foreign Direct Investment In China: Some lesions for 
other countries”, IMF Policy Discussion Paper 2002/3, www.imf.org.  
 
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2004 
 
Learning And Governance In Inter-Firm Relations 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1122 
 
Organisational Learning And Multinational Strategy 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1123 
 
Density And Strength Of Ties In Innovation Networks: A Competence And Governance View 
Bart Nooteboom and Victor A. Gilsing 
ERS-2004-005-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1124 
 
Innovation, learning and cluster dynamics 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1125 
 
Empirical Tests Of Optimal Cognitive Distance 
Stefan Wuyts, Massimo G. Colombo, Shantanu Dutta, and Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1126 
 
Entrepreneurship in Transition: Searching for governance in China’s new private sector 
Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2004-008-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1128 
 
Exploring Emotional Competence: Its effects on coping, social capital, and performance of salespeople 
Willem Verbeke, Frank Belschak and Richard P. Bagozzi 
ERS-2004-014-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1174 
 
The Impact of Business Ownership Change on Employee Relations: Buy-outs in the UK and the Netherlands 
Hans Bruining, Paul Boselie, Mike Wright and Nicolas Bacon 
ERS-2004-021-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1263 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
Towards a Dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-026-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1264 
 
The Three-Step Test-Interview (TSTI): An observational instrument for pretesting self-completion questionnaires  
Tony Hak, Kees van der Veer and Harrie Jansen 
ERS-2004-029-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1265 
 
Measuring the Knowledge Base of an Economy in terms of Triple-Helix Relations among ‘Technology, Organization, and 
Territory’ 
Loet Leydesdorff, Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der Panne 
ERS-2004-034-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1300 
 
Paradoxes of Modernist Consumption – Reading Fashions 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-035-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1330 
 
Some Economics of Digital Content 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-036-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1331 
 
Learning Opportunities And Learning Behaviours Of Small Business Starters: Relations With Goal Achievement, Skill 
Development, And Satisfaction 
Marco van Gelderen, Lidewey van der Sluis & Paul Jansen 
ERS-2004-037-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1429 
 
The Process Of New Service Development – Issues Of Formalization And Appropriability 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-051-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1445 
 
On And Off The Beaten Path: How Individuals Broker Knowledge Through Formal And Informal Networks 
Rick Aalbers, Wilfred Dolfsma & Otto Koppius 
ERS-2004-066-LIS/ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1549 
 
Governance Modes For Systemic Innovation. Service Development In Mobile Telecommunications 
J. van den Ende and F. Jaspers 
ERS-2004-067-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1539 
 
Performance Management: A model and research agenda 
Deanne N. den Hartog, Paul Boselie & Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2004-068-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1779 
 
Human Resource Function Competencies In European Companies 
Paul Boselie and Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2004-069-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1451 
 
"Best Practices…in spite of Performance" Just a matter of Imitation? 
Jaap Paauwe and Paul Boselie 
ERS-2004-070-ORG 
 
Web-Based Organizing In Traditional Brick-And-Mortar Companies: The Impact On HR 
Jaap Paauwe, Elaine Farndale and Roger Williams 
ERS-2004-071-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1609 
 
Longevity in services: the case of the Dutch warehousing companies 1600-2000 
Hugo van Driel, Henk Volberda and Sjoerd Eikelboom 
ERS-2004-072-STR/ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1571 
 
Honing and Framing Ourselves (Extreme Subjectivity and Organizing) 
Sławomir Magala 
ERS-2004-076-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1583 
 
Cross-cultural compromises, multiculturalism and the actuality of unzipped Hofstede 
Sławomir Magala 
ERS-2004-078-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1584 
 
Perceptions about the ISO 9000 (2000) quality system standard revision and its value: The Dutch experience 
T. van der Wiele, J. Iwaarden, R. Williams and B. Dale 
ERS-2004-081-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1736 
 
Mystery shopping: A tool to develop insight into customer service provision 
M. Hesselink, J. van Iwaarden and T. van der Wiele 
ERS-2004-082-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1737 
 
A transparent role of information systems within business processes: A case study 
Menno Verboom, Jos van Iwaarden and Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2004-083-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1738 
 
Understanding the development of temporary agency work in Europe 
Bas Koene, Jaap Paauwe and John Groenewegen 
ERS-2004-086-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1803 
 
Central Unification versus Local Diversity: China’s Tax Regime, 1980s-2000s 
Ze Zhu and Barbara Krug 
ERS-2004-089-ORG 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1787 
 
The evolution of high-technology in China after 1978: Towards technological entrepreneurship 
M.J. Greeven 
ERS-2004-092-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1785 
 
Effects of multiple network ties Knowledge transfer and sharing in a network: The effects of multiple ties 
Irma Bogenrieder 
ERS-2004-093-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1781 
 
Multiple Inclusion and Community Networks 
Irma Bogenrieder and Peter van Baalen 
ERS-2004-094-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1782 
 
 
The Performance Of Team Start-Ups In The First Phases Of The Life Course  
Erik Stam And Veronique Schutjens 
ERS-2004-097-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1784 
 
How To Be Better Prepared For A Paradigm Shift In Economic Theory, And Write Better Articles In The Meantime 
Pat Welch and Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-101-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1811 
 
Is China a Leviathan? 
Ze Zhu And Barbara Krug 
ERS-2004-103-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1821 
 
Market and Society: How do they relate, and contribute to welfare? 
Wilfred Dolfsma, John Finch and Robert McMaster 
ERS-2004-105-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1824 
 
Determinants Of Entrepreneurship In Europe 
Isabel Grilo And Roy Thurik 
ERS-2004-106-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1823 
 
Agent based computational model of trust 
Alexander Gorobets and Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-108-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1840 
 
A Matter of Life and Death: Innovation and Firm Survival 
Elena Cefis and Orietta Marsili 
ERS-2004-109-ORG 
 
Using Networks For Changing Innovation Strategy: The Case Of IBM 
Koen Dittrich, Geert Duysters and Ard-Pieter de Man 
ERS-2004-111-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1836 
 
Historical Attitudes and Implications for path dependence: FDI development and Institutional changes in China 
Xueyuan Zhang, Barbara Krug and Patrick Reinmoeller 
ERS-2004-112-ORG 
 
China’s emerging tax regime: Devolution, fiscal federalism, or tax farming? 
Barbara Krug, Ze Zhu and Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2004-113-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1841 
 
